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INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Michael Dear proposed the ‘welfare city’, in which the most vulnerable populations 
were supported by the state and, crucially, were afforded centrally-located urban space – the 
epitome of which was the emergence of service-dependent ghettoes for deinstitutionalized 
mental patients then flocking to the inner cities of North America (Dear, 1980). Since the 
2000s, there have been calls for acknowledging the emergence of a ‘post-welfare city’ city, 
characterized instead by focused entrepreneurial policies while denigrating and punishing 
non-producers and non-consumers (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Currently, the post-welfare 
city is distinguished by “a period of intensely coordinated activity to dismantle the liberal 
welfare state in accordance with the new ideological and political imperatives of market 
liberalism” (Fairbanks, 2009: 17). These new tendencies threaten to undermine the 
longstanding geographies of help that anchored the poor and vulnerable to the inner city in 
highly agglomerated support systems.  
Of course, the distinction between the welfare and post-welfare city is rarely so 
clearcut, and in fact constitutes an important debate about the actual nature of current urban 
social policy, of whether cities of the Global Northhave in fact experienced a dramatic break 
with previous models of support in favor of punishing and displacing the poor (Mitchell, 
2001), or whether there are strong continuities with the welfare city that ensure a measure of 
(residual) support (DeVerteuil, 2015). For those who argue that a fundamental break has 
occurred, evidence has been deployed to show the shift from redistribution to apparent 
revanchism against the poor in the name of profits and city image (MacLeod, 2011). For 
those who argue against the hard break, the transition to the so-called post-welfare city is 
never complete, given the resilient components of the previous welfare city that ensure the 
supportive existing alongside the punitive; as DeVerteuil (2015: 7) argued, “the post-welfare 
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city contains important residues from Keynesianism while simultaneously removing the 
taken-for-granted nature of welfare and the role of the state in its provision”.  
 Within this debate, it is increasingly crucial to clarify the role of the third sector (also 
deemed the voluntary sector), given its pivotal task in managing the poor and vulnerable. 
This is particularly pressing at the margins of the (emerging) system, in the neglected ‘in-
between’ and precarious components of help that are threatened by shifts in national politics, 
and serving stigmatized clientele. One particularly marginal component is the immigrant-
serving sector (DeVerteuil, 2011a), which deals with a precarious population (especially if 
they are work precarious and/or lacking citizenship), set within an asymmetrical relationship 
with the state that makes it vulnerable to anti-immigrant backlashes and ideologically-driven 
austerity. Moreover, the immigrant-serving sector must respond to clients who straddle two 
worlds – the recipient nation as well as the sending nation in what Roy (2009) called ‘extra-
territorial’ space – and who are engaged in precarious work with low pay, unsocial hours, no 
benefits, and so forth.  
In this paper, I focus on the position that the immigrant-serving third sector occupies 
within the post-welfare city, potentially ranging from doing the state’s dirty work in a 
punitive frame to being openly supportive of clients, to challenging the state’s position vis-à-
vis work precarious migrants, to somewhere in between. Despite the focus on work 
precarious migrants in particular, the labor market itself will not be examined, given that 
there is plentiful research already on how it generates material precarities among migrants 
(e.g. Datta et al., 2007; Martin, 2011, 2012; Coe, 2013; Lewis et al, 2015). Rather, there is a 
need to move precarity beyond a material condition primarily embedded in exploitative labor 
markets, and toward the relational experiences and identities bound up in this precarity, 
especially the responses of various institutional absorbers and protectors in the wake of 
corrosive labor practices (e.g. Martin, 2011; Ehrkamp & Nagel, 2014). In particular, the third 
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sector, as an institutional formation lying in tension with the state, market and informal 
community (DeVerteuil, 2011a), can be a potential buffer to state absence and neglect, but 
can also work alongside or mitigate against and challenge an overbearing state, the exact 
balance of which animates the focus of this paper, responding to the ontological insecurity 
that is at the heart of precarity (Standing, 2011).  
Upon outlining the proposed roles of the third sector within the post-welfare city, I 
present a case study of Greater London, with 15 interviews of immigrant-serving third sector 
organizations across well-served Inner London boroughs (Hackney, Newham, Tower 
Hamlets) and less well-served Outer London boroughs (Brent, Hounslow). The results 
indicated a mixed intermediary role for third sector organizations: strong in compensating 
and filling the gaps from an absent state, yet rather weak in protecting against, contesting or 
challenging the overbearing state on behalf of their clients. More generically, the results also 
underlined the importance of looking beyond the labor market to appreciate the full 
complexities of social reproduction among precarious populations. Further, investigating the 
role of the third sector at the margins of post-welfare city sheds light on the shadow state and 
radical breaks with previous structures, versus continuity and supportive tendencies.  
 
 
THE THIRD SECTOR AT THE MARGINS OF THE (INCOMPLETE) POST-
WELFARE CITY 
The sprawling, residual, permeable and largely unregulated nature of the third sector makes it 
difficult to pin down, likened to a “loose and baggy monster” (Kendall & Knapp, 1995). The 
term ‘sector’ also implies “that these entities, however diverse, together make up a coherent 
whole – a sector with its own distinct type of social form and practical logic” (Corry, 2010: 
11). Third sector organizations can be conceived as “that sector of society which 
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encompasses formal, nonprofit distributing organizations that are both self-governing and 
constitutionally independent of the state” (Milligan, 2009: 165). Currently, the third sector 
occupies a rather important niche, frequently asked to fill in the gaps when and where state, 
market or community failure occurs (Trudeau & Veronis, 2009; Clifford, 2012). The third 
sector is a subset of a residually-defined “civil society”, the “arena of un-coerced collective 
action around shared interested, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are 
distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries 
between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated” 
(Centre for Civil Society, 2009).  
How does the third sector fit into the post-welfare city? While part of the question that 
this paper seeks to answer, there are some existing constructs to help guide us. The first is the 
shadow state concept, in which the third sector acts as a stopgap measure. In Wolch’s (1990: 
xvi) words, the shadow state emerges as a “a para-state apparatus comprise of multiple 
voluntary sector organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic politics and 
charged with major collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public 
sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control”. Within this construct, the third 
sector is enrolled in the state’s ‘dirty work’ of managing unwanted and vulnerable 
populations, to the point where it is difficult to distinguish it from neoliberal oversight and 
punitiveness (DeVerteuil, 2015). In this pessimistic account, the third sector becomes what 
Peck and Tickell (2002: 43) called the “’little platoons’ in the shape of (local) voluntary and 
faith-based associations in the service of neoliberal goals”, part and parcel of the post-welfare 
city, if not its epitome.  
 Conversely, others perceive the third sector as more independent of the state and more 
explicitly supportive to clients as they struggle with an (incomplete) post-welfare city 
(DeVerteuil, 2015). In this construct, the sector acts as a crucial “boundary institution” 
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between the welfare state, market forces and precarious communities (Brandsen et al., 2005). 
The third sector is therefore best understood as a diverse platform that retains some of its 
unruly, grassroots, ethical and subversive elements balanced with more corporatist modes 
(Fairbanks, 2009; Corry, 2010), acting as a last-ditch measure of support for the precarious 
(Martin, 2010, 2011, 2012). In response to these immediate material needs, “third sector 
organizations maintain a critical layer of social protection that…can mean the difference 
between life and death” (Evans, 2011: 24), helping to structure complex “geographies of 
survival” (Mitchell & Heynen, 2009; DeVerteuil, 2015). Working via a sense of obligation 
for precarious populations, third sector spaces also function as alternative spaces of 
citizenship by tolerating and sustaining those excluded by neoliberalism (Trudeau 2008; 
Evans, 2011). 
Along these lines, Trudeau and Veronis (2009) used the concept of the third sector as 
“translation mechanism” that actively, yet never uniformly, enacts state policy – neither 
100% independent from nor 100% co-opted by the welfare state, and always in contingent 
and path-dependent ways. Williams et al (2012) noted how faith-based third sector 
organizations can revise, resist and refuse state-directed edicts. And in her study of migrant 
civil society organizations, Martin (2011) saw third sector organizations as crucial 
intermediaries, alternatives, buffers and counter-movements to unregulated markets, 
protecting migrant labor from their deleterious effects. Her findings also serve as a reminder 
that the third sector is not necessarily the pawn of the state. By their very existence, the third 
sector and civil society provide important cushioning and buffering that counter the excesses 
of the market and the state, thwarting the unlimited power of both.  
While these opposing constructs can be used to develop a relational approach to the 
third sector in the post-welfare city, we need to know more about the positioning of the third 
sector at the margins of the putative post-welfare city itself. By ‘margins’, I mean the third 
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sector’s dealings with highly maligned and powerless clients for whom the state offers only 
austerity and/or punishment. In this case, work precarious migrants fit quite well – they are 
stigmatized as job-stealers, they are difficult to organize, they are politically ignored save for 
high-profile bouts of disdain, they lack full citizenship and are sometimes illegal, they are 
geographically invisible, and their social reproduction is rarely met solely through their paltry 
wages, giving rise to alternate sources of support, including the third sector.  
While the role of the third sector as a boundary institution situated between migrants 
and the labor market is well-established (e.g. Bhuyan, 2011; Cordero-Guzman, 2005; Martin, 
2011; DeVerteuil, 2011a), we know appreciably less about how the third sector fits into the 
post-welfare city – is it more on the side of the shadow state, or the more independent model? 
The role of the urban is also crucial here - work precarious migrants are especially 
concentrated in global cities, where demand for their degraded labor runs high. But so fraught 
and unstable are conditions of work, and so weak are the measures of state support, that many 
migrants seek alternate support for their social reproduction, including informal communities 
and family and, as we shall focus on in the ensuing section, the third sector, in this case 
London as an (incomplete) post-welfare city.  
 
LONDON AND THE UK CONTEXT 
Since the 1990s, London has attracted increasing numbers of economic migrants – with some 
employed in high-end jobs, but the majority in low-end, low-skill positions (Spence, 2005; 
McDowell et al, 2009). At both ends, there is a sense that UK-born workers are either 
insufficiently trained (high-end) or insufficiently prepared for long hours of poorly-
remunerated work (low-end), which in turn feeds into workforce polarization (May et al, 
2007). For the high-end, certain nationalities predominate: Americans, Australians, Japanese, 
Northern and Western Europeans, all of whom have employment rates over 75% and a 
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disproportionate share of managerial positions, even when compared to UK-born residents 
(Spence, 2005). This is in contrast to the low-end segment, where some groups predominate 
(Eastern Europeans) while others suffer from employment rates below 40% (e.g. Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Turkey). As Wills et al (2010: 19) summarized with regards to the low end, “while 
the UK’s native workers have proved reluctant to take up the low-paid jobs that have been so 
devalued over the past 30 years, partly as a result of increased subcontracting, employers 
have increasingly taken on migrant workers instead”.  
But even within this working poor migrant population, there is considerable variation 
in terms of state management (McDowell et al, 2009). Citizens of the A8 accession nations 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) have 
worked freely in the UK since 2004, yet non-EU citizens have been almost entirely barred as 
economic migrants (Spence, 2005; McDowell et al, 2009). This is particularly consequential 
to those economic migrants from Latin America, Africa and Asia, for whom working in 
London represents an important employment opportunity (Wills et al, 2010). As such, it 
seems that the incoming Europeans are now pushing out Global South migrants for 
economically-precarious jobs, just as the latter pushed out native-born BME (Black and 
Minority Ethnicity) in the 1990s (Datta et al, 2007). This is reflected in employment data: in 
2004, BME groups had lower employment rates than British White and European migrants, 
while certain Global South migrant groups were more likely to be unemployed than working 
poor – particularly if they came as legal refugees, such as Somalis, Afghanis and Eritreans 
(Spence, 2005). This pressure has only been exacerbated by a new points system in April 
2008 that again favored high-skilled and EU and further limited non-EU low-skill labor to 
virtually zero (Wills et al, 2010); this situation, however, has been thrown into doubt with the 
recent Brexit vote in June 2016, in which a majority (52%) of British voters signaled their 
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displeasure with remaining in the EU more generally, and with accepting low-skilled EU 
migrants more particularly.  
The increasing state oversight of UK migration –with increasingly discriminatory, if 
not overbearing, tendencies – had its roots in the 1997-2010 New Labor government. During 
this period, a ‘managed migration’ was instituted, with emphasis on slotting and stratifying 
migrants to particular labor niches. According to May et al. (2007), the New Labour 
government sought to attract growing numbers of both highly skilled and low-skilled workers 
to Britain, with an expansion of existing temporary worker schemes. As a result, the number 
of people legally entering Britain to work rose considerably, with the number of work permits 
issued to foreign-born workers increasing from around 40 000 a year in the mid-1990s to 
over 200 000 a year in 2004 (Wills et al., 2010). This managed migration also introduced a 
strict hierarchy of classes of entry and associated privileges, ranging from the right to settle 
for the highly skilled, to only temporary admission with no rights to benefits for the low 
skilled (Lewis et al., 2015). Since 2010 and the new Coalition government, there has been a 
noticeable backlash against precarious migrants in the UK, in the form of policy reforms 
designed to drive down net migration from historical highs in the 2000s. These reforms 
included: closing the immigration route for highly skilled migrants to come to the UK to find 
employment; tightened eligibility rules for benefits (in anticipation to the accession of 
Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2014); and more stringent rules around minimum 
incomes requirements for migrants and citizenship (Grove-White, 2014). All of this has 
occurred within a context of general unpleasantness associated with the rise of UKIP (United 
Kingdom Independence Party) in the run-up to the 2015 national election and arguably 
culminating, at least for the time being, in the June 2016 Brexit vote. 
Yet the emergence of an overbearing state does not necessarily replace the 
longstanding and persistently absent state – absent in the sense of regulations, support and 
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recognition with the labor market, via a pervasive lack of interest in enforcing basic labor 
laws. Indeed, work precarious migrants are especially concentrated in hospitality, health care, 
restaurants and cleaning, industries not known for their intensive governmental oversight 
(Wills et al., 2010). Compounding this is the post-2010 austerity in the UK, which has led to 
cutbacks to local councils and to the third sector that caters to migrants. MacInnes et al. 
(2011: 88) noted that the initial cutbacks in 2010 to local councils in London were part of an 
overall national withdrawals amounting to over £2.1 billion, a 26% reduction. Impacts were 
disproportionately on those poorer London boroughs with large migrant populations, such as 
Tower Hamlets, which saw 8% of their budgets cut, or at least £35 million. These direct cuts 
to council funding will invariably be passed down to third sector organizations, many of 
whom are dependent on council funding (DeVerteuil, 2011b; Clifford, 2012). The shortfall in 
statutory funding for the voluntary sector between 2010 and 2012 was estimated at £3.3 
billion, “which cannot realistically be recouped through philanthropic donations or social 
enterprise” (Milbourne, 2013: 225). As an added pressure, there have also been recent caps 
placed on housing benefits, meaning that certain dependent immigrant households may now 
be at risk of being evicted altogether from Inner London properties (Hamnett, 2014).  
 Before engaging with the results of the research, we must foreground London as a 
post-welfare city. Doreen Massey underlined a certain contradiction with London’s 
longstanding claim to openness and generosity, products of the Keynesian era: “this is a city 
at the very center of the reassertion of marketization, profit, and privatization, which yet 
imagines itself (and not incorrectly) as open, as hospitable, indeed, in a certain sense, as 
generous to the outside world” (Massey, 2011: 6). She reinforced the notion that London “is a 
unique articulation: a place where market capitalism is in part produced and propagated, yet 
where it is also still embedded in (the remains of) a social democratic settlement” (Massey, 
2007: 58). In this sense, London retains a solid welfare city foundation via extensive third 
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sector support and social housing (over 15% of the housing stock), alongside post-welfare 
tendencies in the form of austerity-based cuts to housing benefits and local funding set within 
national anti-migrant tendencies (Wills et al, 2010; (Hamnett, 2014; DeVerteuil, 2015). The 
overall impacts of this combined overbearing and absent state will be studied via the third 
sector in those London boroughs where work precarious migrants disproportionately cluster, 
split into well-served boroughs in Inner London (Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets) and 
less well-served boroughs in Outer London (Brent, Hounslow). These boroughs also feature 
difficult housing situations, conflicted between being a repository for affordable housing 
while also under increasing pressure from gentrification and the steady erosion of social 
housing (MacInnes et al, 2011).  
 
METHODS 
My sample focused exclusively on third sector organizations that primarily served a migrant 
clientele, as it was difficult to solely target organizations dealing exclusively with the work 
precarious migrant clientele. Moreover, the sample was cast as exploratory rather than 
systematic or representative, with the aim of empirical “saturation” (Small, 2009), that is 
diminishing new information for each subsequent interview rather than the seeking some sort 
of quantitative representativeness. Following Martin (2011), I validated the ‘migrant 
orientation’ in the sample by ensuring (1) that at least 30% of the clientele are immigrants, 
and whose goals are to enhance their well-being (Cordero-Guzman, 2005), with (2) the 
explicit incorporation of “…cultural components, and a consciousness of ethnic or national-
origin identity, into their mission, practices, services and programmes” (Cordero-Guzman 
2005: 884), and (3) legally recognized and registered as a charity in the UK. Across Greater 
London, there were 1,888 organizations listed that fell into all three categories. The larger 
sample was then stratified by the five London boroughs of interest –
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organizations per 1000 people, I found that the first three (Hackney, Newham, Tower 
Hamlets) were well-served when compared to their (large) immigrant populations, but that 
the last two (Brent, Hounslow) were under-served when compared to their (growing) 
immigrant populations. With 2011 census data, White British-born residents were in the 
minority in three boroughs (Brent, Newham, Tower Hamlets) and a bare majority in Hackney 
and Hounslow (UK, 2011). A second stratification was then performed by focusing only on 
third-sector organizations that provided (1) social and cultural, (2) educational, (3) 
employment and (4) housing services, all of which are key support services for work 
precarious migrants. At that point, the sample had dwindled to 227 organizations. Given the 
traditionally low response rates among third sector organizations (DeVerteuil, 2011b), it was 
perhaps no surprise that only 15 organizations were willing to interview – this may also be 
due to the particularly touchy subject of migration in the UK since 2010. However, these 15 
interviews – done in Spring 2014 - provided a rich insight into the types of services provided, 
how they were funded, for which clientele, and to what ends with regards to work precarious 
migrants. Further, non-respondents were perhaps even more vulnerable and marginal, such 
that my sample understates the marginal position within the larger third sector and putative 
post-welfare city.  
A series of background questions were asked, relating to (1) the type of services 
provided, the clientele, and funding; (2) the relationship to the geographic area and 
community; and (3) specific relationship to work precarious migrants. If at all possible, the 
focus was on interviewing longstanding members of the organization, especially executive 
directors who would have a wide understanding of both day-to-day operations and long-term 
goals and strategies. For the Inner London boroughs, five were in Tower Hamlets, four in 
Newham and one in Hackney; for the Outer London boroughs, three were in Brent and two in 
Hounslow, as Table 1 shows below.   
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Table 1: Sampled of Immigrant-serving Third Sector Organizations 
 
An interesting divergence emerged almost immediately: many of the Inner London 
organizations had London-wide vocations and clientele, rather than the intensely local ones in 
Outer London. This speaks to the sense that boroughs like Tower Hamlets and Newham are 
traditional migrant destinations and have, over more than 100 years, becomes crucibles for 
immigrant rights and experiences, platforms for both survival and the call for social justice 
(DeVerteuil, 2011a). Conversely, Brent and Hounslow organizations were founded more 
recently, smaller and were less well-connected to the broader London migrant experience. 
For all but three organizations, the clientele was 100% migrant (first- or second-generation); 
while some focused exclusively on one particular group (e.g. Lebanese, Caribbean, Chinese), 
others were pan-ethnic and more likely to be vocal on matters of migration policy. The size 
of the typical organization was quite small – fewer than twenty volunteers – and most of the 
funding was directly from the local council, although several of the Outer London 
organizations had no governmental funding at all. When compared to the 18,958 registered 
third sector organizations in Greater London in 2013, my  sampled organization was on 
average smaller, more marginal and less government-funded (DeVerteuil, 2015: 63).  
  
RESULTS 
What did the results show in terms of clarifying the third sector’s role at the margins of the 
post-welfare city? Two key themes that emerged from the sample: (1) the need to ‘fill the 
gaps’ of an absent state, and so connecting to more supportive tendencies; and (2) the 
relatively muted contestation to the overbearing state, and so connecting to more shadow 
state tendencies. The following material will expand upon these themes, of how they were 
articulated by the different organizations. But before beginning on the first theme, it is 
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worthwhile underlining some commonalities across the entire sample- namely that clientele 
precarity was pervasive. For Newham1, which provided recreational and educational support 
services for local migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers, the precarious conditions 
were palpable:  
“What I have seen with my students is very, very occasional work…they are, the majority, in 
fact all of the South Americans are cleaners. They must have, I don’t know how they actually 
got their jobs but they must have registered with agencies that will call them up…on 
occasions when there is work available. Some of my older students have actually worked on 
building sites, but very occasionally, maybe a day here or there. So it’s extremely 
precarious…” 
While not the focus of this paper, there was an unequivocal relationship between legal 
precarity and work precarity, with the former exacerbating the latter. A refugee and asylum-
seeker organization (Tower Hamlets3) described their clientele as follows:  
“And in terms of where people live, a large number of people who come to us are actually 
homeless, so will be sleeping with friends, staying with friends or in emergency 
accommodation of one kind or another, or in sheds, or temporary accommodation, shanty 
town type accommodation in London. Income levels, some people working in exploitative 
work on low pay. Some on benefits, not very many, but some on benefits. But a majority, a 
large number…are on no recourse to public funds.” 
The pervasive precarity among migrants creates demand for services that are primarily (and 
sometimes only) provided by the third sector, yet this gap-filling is not in isolation – it can 
link to more supportive or sinister motivations among the third sector, as the next main 
sections seek to explore and clarify.   
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The absent state and the third sector 
The results suggested that the longstanding neglect of the state vis-à-vis work precarious 
migrants had generated gap-filling activities among the third sector, but that this situation had 
been compounded by recent austerity that had placed more demands compounded by fewer 
resources. The gap-filling activities situate the third sector in a distinctly buffering and 
mitigating roles (Martin, 2011), aligning more with the supportive tendencies and boundary-
spanning work of the third sector in the post-welfare city, in the way of a ‘translation 
mechanism’ outlined by Trudeau and Veronis (2009).  
As a first example, Newham3, a resource centre for African and Afro-Caribbean 
populations, many of which depend on low-paying employment, attended to the many ‘gaps’ 
that have to be filled on an everyday basis without access to state-funded benefits:  
“One is housing which we’ve already talked about which is they need a place to lay their 
head, some of them end up staying with people they know and that creates problems with 
overcrowding in housing. There are too many people under one roof. Also…financing for 
them is a big problem. Job Seekers Allowance is not enough for them to take care of 
themselves. If they are looking for jobs they need money to transport themselves to areas 
further from home so they might have an interview and not necessarily have the money to go 
that far, so were the jobs are available is too far from where they live. Even if they’ve got one 
and it’s not very well paid, to transport themselves from where they then live so sometimes 
it’s just working to use the money for transport so you’d say no to that job”. 
In response, the organization provided a panoply of services, including afterschool clubs, 
lunch clubs, hot-desking, support for public transportation and housing advice, with very few 
strings attached. All 15 organizations noted the drop in statutory funding since 2010 – with 
three losing their funding entirely (in Brent and Housnlow) and were now entirely self-
funded, and two relying primarily on renting out their premises. The absence of the state in 
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providing for work precarious migrants was especially glaring for under-served communities 
(Hackney1 and Tower Hamlets3 respectively), in terms of the impossibility of accessing the 
otherwise reasonably generous welfare state for UK citizens:  
 “I think it’s the newer communities that are really facing a challenge, particularly Eastern 
European communities. There are specific organizations that do support them, there’s the 
Eastern European Advice Centre, but they are few and far between and direct support in 
terms of letting people know about their rights and entitlements, linking people up to other 
people in the community who have come recently and therefore may have networks to 
employment opportunities…are sparse”. Hackney1 
The lack of appropriate institutional support is compounded by persistent state inaction that 
borders on the neglectful and the unjust:  
“…it’s more about immigration rules and regulation. It’s about inefficiency and inter-
bureaucracy, it’s about legal aid – access to justice is a really crucial part of it. I would say 
the biggest thing that impacts is the total inefficiency and incompetence of the Home Office 
so you could resolve somebody’s case quite quickly if their case was resolved by the Home 
Office. If they had access to legal aid we could resolve those cases quite quickly. I think the 
no recourse to public funds component of immigration regulation is poisonous and that 
creates a lot of difficulties for our caseworkers”. Tower Hamlets3 
These quotes speak to the translating of byzantine state policies according to a consistently 
supportive approach. In effect, the third sector provided no-strings, stopgap support for these 
bereft of the full entitlements of citizenship. Yet set within persistent state inaction emerges 
the larger context of austerity in the wake of the 2010 Coalition government, in which third 
sector organizations must now increasingly operate:  
“It used to be [that] most of our money came in from the local council, and from trusts and 
foundations by applying for grants…then the council stopped giving grants and introduced 
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contracts and as a result, our income from the council dropped quite substantially, so now the 
biggest income for us is from our self-generated income, followed by grants from trusts and 
foundations and then the contracts we have from Newham council…” (Newham1) 
Funding cuts means more time devoted to applying for funding as well as responding to the 
emerging imperatives of austerity. This has also meant that those who work for the third 
sector are themselves feeling precarious:  
“It is external factors making the job more difficult. It’s funding, it’s having to do – when the 
Government came into power, I remember one of the things that was said is that we all have 
to volunteer and you know, I really cannot go to the bank and say to the bank ‘I volunteered 
this week’, I’ve got to pay my mortgage and I find it’s getting more and more difficult to see 
how, they are saying we’re getting out of a recession so from that point of view it is external, 
the funding isn’t there and you’re expected to do more work for less money. You’re expected 
to put in longer hours, unsociable hours. You know, it comes a point where you have to think 
to yourself, what’s this all about?” Hounslow2 
In response to austerity, there has been a drive towards more intensive alliances to fill the 
gaps, which works better in well-served boroughs than poorly-served ones. Tower Hamlets4, 
an English-language skills provided, mentioned the need to work with other third sector 
organizations in their immediate area:  
“We’re a member of the community alliance London Citizens so we’re a dues-paying 
member…which means we’re connected to that organisation in Southwark which is where a 
lot of our activities are, a lot of our work is around Elephant and Castle and Camberwell so 
we’re then very well connected to another 12 organisations who are connected to that 
alliance, and we do join up to do the political work with them –campaign on issues like 
housing and child destitution at the moment and that’s with an array of organisations from 
schools to faith organisations to charities. And then we’re quite well connected to other 
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campaigning organisations like Work on Work Fair and briefly in the past Migrant - Justice 
for Migrants or something like that, and Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants, where we 
did some campaigning together on changes to immigration laws”. 
In the face of an absent (and increasingly austere) state, the third sector performed as a 
‘translation mechanism’, providing last-ditch support for under-served migrant communities 
and smoothing the jagged edges of policy shifts and downward pressure to do more with less. 
Yet absence and austerity are increasingly accompanied by a more overbearing set of state 
policies designed to denigrate and punish the work precarious migrant – the management of 
which is the subject of the next section.   
  
The overbearing state and the third sector 
The results here suggested that the recently interventionist and overbearing nature of state 
policies vis-à-vis migrants, particularly since 2010, had produced consternation but not much 
more from the third sector – and certainly no overt contestation. Given its asymmetrical and 
fragmented nature (DeVerteuil, 2015), the third sector could not actively contest or challenge 
the increasingly anti-immigrant (and anti-poor) policies of the post-2010 Coalition 
government which included not just welfare support but also larger issues around citizenship 
and belonging. The third sector thus emerged as a component of the subservient shadow state, 
but  not necessarily enrolled in punitive policies. The lack of contestation was more out of 
reluctance and being too busy responding to everyday needs than it was with a lack of 
awareness and will. Indeed, the post-2010 impacts have been negative, sowing fear among 
not just work precarious migrants but the organizations that serve them:  
“Yes I think the UK Home Office information, the way in which they conduct raids and 
intimidate employees and employers, I think is going to create an atmosphere which is going 
to make employees more fearful and therefore less likely to challenge an unscrupulous 
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employer. I think the whole precarious way in which people have to live as a result of 
inefficiencies of the Home Office means that people are very vulnerable and I think a large 
unspoken issue really is the issue of inefficiency and the bureaucracy because if people have 
status then they have rights. Without the status they don’t have rights. We’ve had people in 
the country, say from the age of 14, I am thinking of somebody in particular, they come at 14, 
they reach 18, at the age of 18 they wait 11 years and still haven’t heard from the Home 
Office for the result of their immigration application. They’ve spent 18 years, yeah I’m sure 
getting bits of odd jobs here bits of odd jobs there, otherwise all they have is a bed and a 
voucher. Now that is creating the atmosphere where somebody is going to be led into very, 
very poor work…”. Tower Hamlets3 
 Given the increasingly punitive tendencies of state migration policy, clients would 
rather deal directly and exclusively with the third sector (a sector that does not judge them) 
than the mainstream welfare system. The following quote from a third sector educational 
center heavily reliant on user fees (Newham1) illustrates how the Jobcentre, the national 
employment center for those on benefits, has become synonymous with a shadow state 
extension of a more overbearing and vigilant state:  
“One of the things that I do get very concerned about is the Jobcentre taking our students, 
especially those who don’t have any literacy in their own language, taking them away from 
our classes to put them in their own English classes when our students are settled and they’re 
very happy and they’re learning and they take them away simply to, well I don’t want to get 
too political, but I think they need to tick boxes. Because when they are taken away from 
where they are comfortable and feel happy and they’re learning, to go somewhere where no 
one can really relate to that then it’s quite something. The other thing is some of the students 
do have to sign various Home Office points every two weeks and they have to miss classes 
for that, but there’s nothing we can do about this…because they have had to become so much 
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stricter now. No one is allowed to miss their sign-in session…so there’s very little we can do. 
Our students are almost frightened by the Jobcentre, the various agencies that are supposed to 
be helping them specifically they are there to help, they are quite intimidating and quite 
frightening places for some of them”. Newham1 
In contrast to Jobcentre, the third sector organization quoted above is more than gap-filling – 
it presents a friendlier, more palatable face to state-sanctioned austerity and abandonment, but 
not obviously engaged in punitive oversight in concert with the state. More to the point, it 
obscures and deflects the worst impacts; but at the same time, without this support, the most 
vulnerable would surely suffer. The increasing prevalence of ‘no recourse to public funds’ 
was placing greater pressure on third sector organizations as well, with noticeable impacts 
upon clientele need:   
“The welfare reforms have massively impacted the communities. I think there’s been a real 
increase in destitution amongst many communities so in terms of lots more emergency based 
support emerging, in terms of emergency housing and so forth, so it has really negatively 
impacted some of the more well-established communities let alone the newer ones that have 
come through”. Hackney1 
The resources to provide this protection are never quite enough and only worsening in an age 
of austerity, as this quote illustrates quite clearly:  
“Well, I mean, how many people are there and how do you resolve. We need a bank of 
solicitors, we need a whole set of accommodation units, it’s just – there is absolutely no way 
that the infrastructure of the third sector is anything like that. But the infrastructure of the 
third sector militates against the issues and we are just one of the very few people who are 
tackling the problems head on. So, the problems are huge and not being faced by anybody”. 
Tower Hamlets3 
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Faced with an overbearing state and an increasingly vulnerable clientele, most 
organizations ‘made do’ with bricolage and short-term strategies, but did not create a “zone 
of contestation” (Corry, 2010) between hegemonic state demands and shadow state 
tendencies, and the counter-hegemonic desire for fuller, legally-recognized and overall better 
lives for work precarious migrants, with specific services to cater to them. There was not a 
single protest among the 15 organizations, no instances where third sector organizations 
sought to directly challenge not only austerity but also the overbearing interventions into the 
daily lives of work precarious migrants, such as workplace raids and threat of deportation. I 
will the discussion around this state of affairs in terms of the post-welfare city in the next 
section.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results indicated a decidedly intermediary and mediating role for third sector 
organizations: strong in compensating and filling the gaps from an absent state, yet little 
material to suggest that they were contesting or challenging overbearing and punitive 
migration policies on behalf of their clients. More specifically, the results suggested that the 
third sector reacts to (and sometimes anticipates) various state approaches to work precarious 
migrants in at least two ways. The first is that when faced with absence, the third sector 
provides a strong, stabilizing presence, but when faced with an overbearing state, the third 
sector is generally unable to challenge its edicts, aspersions and cutbacks. Just the same, the 
sector provides a (quiet) platform of solidarity that subverts the relentlessly anti-immigrant 
rhetoric of the past six years in the UK, a demonization that will only rise with Brexit. There 
was no doubt that third sector organizations performed what Martin (2011) called ‘buffering’, 
that is mitigating the negative impacts of precarious work. In this respect, third sector 
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organizations where about what Li (2010) called ‘make live’: protection rather than 
dispossession.  
 Exploratory as they are, the results contribute to the resurgence of interest in the 
shadow state within the immigrant-serving sector (e.g. Trudeau and Veronis, 2009), but also 
suggest how the UK shadow state at the margins might be more like the American one, where 
the third sector is more a substitute for the welfare state rather than meeting modest unmet 
needs. As previously mentioned, there were  few instances of what Martin (2011) referred to 
as contestation (e.g. directly challenging agents and policies implicated in causing, or 
perpetuating, precarious work) and the creation of alternatives. Rather, the organizations were 
engaged in the ‘politics of invisibility’ (Ehrkamp & Nagel, 2014), providing sanctuary and 
spaces of sustenance but not necessarily calling for transformation. Just the same, precarity 
did not lead to atomization among the migrants – rather, there was a certain level of solidarity 
via the platform of the third sector. This relates to work by both Datta et al (2007) and 
Bhuyan (2011), who both understand that migrants, faced with difficult odds, tend to adopt 
short-term tactics rather than long-term strategies, usually oriented to providing quick 
solutions rather than deep transformation. So it was the same for the third sector, which 
asserted social rights and membership for work precarious migrants that were in conflict with 
neoliberal values of citizenship, sustained their everyday existence through spaces of 
sanctuary, but lacked the power (or the will) to effect profound transformations in the way 
they are treated by the state and the larger population (see also DeVerteuil, 2003). Returning 
to the margins and building from a modest sample of organizations, the third sector is a 
mediating institution enduringly supportive of clients, yet this support can be to the advantage 
of the (shadow) state; the third sector at the margins rarely challenges the state, but equally 
rarely drifts into the punitive.  
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  Now that the role of the third sector at the margins of the post-welfare city has been 
clarified, more needs to be made about the unevenness at the margins – both in terms of 
provision and geography. For the former, the sense that the post-welfare city is itself 
precarious, always bumping up against the residuals of the welfare city, lends credence to the 
idea that the post-welfare city is uneven. Returning to the debate I presented earlier, I clearly 
side with the continuity of previous welfare structures and strong residuals, rather than a 
fundamental break and a clearcut version of the post-welfare city. Moreover, there was 
something very geographically uneven about this continuity – organizations in the more 
established immigrant boroughs of Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets in Inner London 
were more likely to represent a continuation of previous structures from the welfare city than 
those in the less established Brent and Hounslow in Outer London. In those boroughs, 
organizations were more focused on everyday survival, both their own and of their clientele. 
It would seem that the longstanding concentration of immigrants and services in Inner 
London sustained a more viable ‘absorber’ of an absent state and perhaps partial ‘contester’ 
of an overbearing one. In other words, some boroughs proved more amenable to this specific 
translation of state (non) policy than others. In so doing, this paper recasts the margins as 
more than just dealing with stigmatized clientele – it also signals a potentially useful, though 
ambiguous, political position for the third sector to occupy vis-à-vis the welfare state and 
precarious immigrants, but one that is less evident when teamed with geographically 
marginal locations.  
Future research ought to focus on this urban/suburban gap. Indeed, prosperous cities 
at the top of the urban hierarchy – such as Paris, Sydney, New York and especially London – 
are experiencing a dramatic renewal of the urban core and the subsequent displacement of 
poor people, including work precarious migrants, out to the suburbs (and beyond). This 
displacement has important consequences for how work precarious migrants access services 
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such as health, shelter and food, many of which are now provided by third sector 
organizations and most of which remain concentrated in the inner core (see DeVerteuil, 2015 
on London, Los Angeles and Sydney). Future research should raise the issue of a possible 
mismatch within the London context, of over-supplied yet gentrified inner-cities versus 
under-served, increasingly precarious suburbs. A second avenue for future research could 
well build on the implicit focus on agency among the third sector in the post-welfare city 
where the state no longer holds a monopoly on services – that it may act as a ‘street level 
bureaucracy’ (Lipsky, 1980) in the translation of state policy on the ground. This recasting 
moves beyond the usual roles and motivations of the third sector – abeyance, care, sustenance 
(DeVerteuil, 2013) – to open up new avenues for considering the third sector as a self-
interested and crucial arbiter of scarce goods for which demand is unlimited.  
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